Claude traces NIST curve seeds to a timestamp-based generator
Anthropic says Claude identified how seeds for five NIST elliptic curves were generated, tracing them to a random-number generator initialized with a Unix timestamp rather than a hash algorithm. Anthropic published the result on October 16, 2026.

Key takeaways · 4
- 01
Anthropic says Claude traced the P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 seeds in under half an hour.
- 02
The seeds matched outputs from lrand48(), initialized with Unix timestamps, rather than a hash algorithm.
- 03
Anthropic says the result is not a new attack or a weakness in ECDSA, and users need take no action.
- 04
The explanation makes an intentional backdoor less plausible, according to Anthropic, but some curve details remain unexplained.
What Claude was asked to find
Anthropic says an employee asked an internal research model to determine how the NIST curve seeds were generated, without giving it the rumored clue.[2] Claude identified the origins of seeds for P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 in under half an hour.[2] ECDSA is the most widely used elliptic-curve cryptography standard, according to Anthropic.[2] NIST adopted it in 2000 as part of the FIPS 186-2 Digital Signature Standard.[2] The seed origins had been a longstanding question because the NSA supplied them without explaining their selection.[2]
How the seed pattern was identified
Anthropic says Claude searched the published seeds bit by bit for adjacent chunks matching consecutive outputs from a 1990s-era random-number generator.[2] Four seeds shared a top-bit pattern that Anthropic says would occur by chance with a probability of 1 in 5,810.[2] Claude then recovered the generator state for four seeds by testing all 2¹⁷ possibilities for the first word’s hidden bits and checking the next four words.[2] Anthropic says all ten seeds matched the output pattern lrand48() >> 23.[2] Each iteration drew 20 bytes as a candidate seed, and P-256’s standardized seed was produced after 1,842 iterations.[2]
What the timestamps indicate
Anthropic says the seeds came from the C library’s lrand48 random-number generator initialized with a Unix timestamp, not from a hash algorithm.[2] The ten prime-curve seeds trace to timestamps between May 1997 and April 1998.[2] The four binary-curve initializations point to February 1984, or to April 17, 1998 if the timestamps are doubled.[2] One earlier story held that Jerry Solinas generated the seeds by hashing a humorous passphrase.[2] Anthropic says its findings make an intentional backdoor less plausible.[2]
Limits and user impact
Anthropic says the discovery is not a cryptographic break, a new attack or a weakness in the ECDSA curves.[2] It also says users do not need to take action or change how they use the curves.[2] The explanation does not account for every related detail: The Injection’s account says the B-163 seed and several NIST curve base points remained unexplained.[1] Separately, the full bounty was claimed on October 15, 2026, at 01:07:51 UTC.[3] Valsorda said the bounty was donated to ISRG, which operates Let’s Encrypt, bringing its value to $36,864.[3]
For professionals assessing cryptographic standards, Anthropic says Claude traced the origins of seeds for five NIST elliptic curves to a timestamp-initialized random-number generator. Anthropic says the finding is not a cryptographic break or weakness in the curves, and users need not change how they use them. The Injection’s account says the B-163 seed and several NIST curve base points remained unexplained.
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Start freeHow this developed
18 October 2026
Claude traces NIST curve seeds to a timestamp-based generator
Sources
- Anthropic: Claude traced the NIST ECDSA curve seeds to lrand48theinjection.dev
- Claude reveals ECDSA curve origins \\ Anthropicanthropic.com
- The NIST Elliptic Curves Seeds Bounty Has Been Claimedwords.filippo.io